

from Logos and Glory  
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b. The Two Principles in *Gaudium et spes* 24:3

Pascal Ide has shown that John Paul II gives a key place in his theology to *Gaudium et spes* 24:3. He uses this Council text to articulate a comprehensive theology of gift rooted in the Trinity.<sup>8</sup> In tracing the development of Wojtyła's thinking from its origins to TOB, it is useful to begin with this point of arrival, with John Paul II's mature Trinitarian personalism of self-gift. When one knows the point of arrival, it is easier to understand the road that leads to it. Trinitarian gift is the deepest form-giving element in TOB. In their gift of self to each other, man and woman are an image of the Trinity.

In *Gaudium et spes* 24:3, the Council teaches,

Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when he prays to the Father, "that all may be one...as we are one" (John 17:21-22) and thus offers vistas closed to human reason, indicates a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons and the union of God's sons in Truth and Love. This likeness shows that man, who is the only creature on earth God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of self (cf. Luke 17:33).

The two principles expressed in the last sentence of this text provide an integral vision of human life, beginning and end, without omitting the middle. The first, "God wills man for himself, for his own sake," is equivalent to what Wojtyła calls "the personalistic norm."<sup>9</sup> Persons should not be used as mere means, but as having their own ends. This norm stands *at the beginning* of the life of persons. It is connected with rational *nature* by which persons are persons in the first place and with the lived experience of personal subjectivity that arises from this nature. Persons can know and pursue the good. Only for them, therefore, can one truly will the good for their own sake, which is to will the persons themselves for their own sake. Every person possesses this dignity from the very beginning of existence. It does not need to be acquired. The second principle, "cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of self," concerns *the end* of the life of persons. It is a matter of "*fully* finding," of perfection. Perfection needs to be acquired and is fully acquired only at the end.

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<sup>8</sup> See Pascal Ide, "Une théologie du don: Les occurrences de *Gaudium et spes*, n. 24, §3 chez Jean-Paul II," *Anthropotes* 17 (2001).

<sup>9</sup> See Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 21-44.

(1) *Personal Subjectivity*

Aristotle touches on the personalistic norm in his discussion of friendship.

Of love of lifeless objects we do not use the word “friendship,” for it is not mutual love (ἀντιφίλησις), nor is there a wishing of good to the other. It would surely be funny to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself. But to a friend we say we ought to wish what is good for his sake (δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα).<sup>10</sup>

It is with such a love of friendship, according to St. Thomas, that God provides for creatures whose nature has the power of intellectual knowledge and will.

Divine providence provides for intellectual creatures for their own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of these... Only the intellectual nature is, therefore, sought for itself in the universe, but all other things for its sake.<sup>11</sup>

Crosby comments on this text,

The modern reader sees to his amazement that St. Thomas here has already made his own the Kantian idea that each person in a sense exists for his own sake (is an end in himself)...<sup>12</sup>

If one interprets Crosby’s phrase “for his own sake” and “end in himself” in the sense of the beneficiary of the good, it is an accurate reading of St. Thomas. All good, according to St. Thomas exists for the sake of persons. In Kant, by contrast, the person is “that for the sake of which” and “end,” not in the sense of *being the beneficiary* of the good, but of *being the supreme good*, which is identical with the autonomy of the will.

## (a) The Personalistic Norm in Kant

For Kant, the personalistic norm is an alternate way of formulating the first principle of ethics, the categorical imperative.<sup>13</sup>

While man is unholy enough, the *humanity* in his person must be holy to him. In all of creation, everything one might want and over which one has power can be used *as a mere means*. Only man himself and with him every rational creature is *end in itself*. For, in virtue of the autonomy of his freedom, he is the subject of the moral law, which is holy.<sup>14</sup>

The practical imperative is thus the following. *Act in such a way that at all times you treat human nature in your own person as well as in the person of every other human being simultaneously as a purpose, never as a mere means.*<sup>15</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8.2, 1155b.27-31.

<sup>11</sup> St. Thomas, *Contra gentiles*, 3.112.2-3.

<sup>12</sup> John F. Crosby, *The Selfhood of the Human Person* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 20, footnote 8.

<sup>13</sup> See below, pp. ###.###.

<sup>14</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft [Critique of Practical Reason]*, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5 (Berlin: Königlich-Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, [orig. publ. 1785] 1902-), 5.87, cf. 5.131. See also Immanuel Kant, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten [The Metaphysics of Morals]*, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6 (Berlin: Königlich-Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, [orig. publ. 1793] 1902-), 6.434.

<sup>15</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten [Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals]*, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4 (Berlin: Königlich-Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, [orig. publ. 1785] 1902-), 4.429.

The categorical imperative says, “Act in such a way that at any time the maxim of your will can at the same time be valid as a principle of a universal legislation.”<sup>16</sup> By acting according to this categorical imperative, Kant holds, one grasps one’s own dignity as an autonomous person. Autonomy consists in moving *oneself* in the most radical sense of “oneself,” namely, as the universal lawgiver for oneself and for all other persons. In this autonomy, one must consider the humanity in oneself the only thing that has absolute value, the only final end of the entire cosmos. It immediately follows that one must affirm the dignity of others as well. One can only be consistent with oneself in affirming one’s own dignity, if one grants the same dignity to other persons.

For, so runs Kant’s argument, suppose one did not grant this dignity to others, but only to oneself. One’s maxim, that is, the practical universal principle valid for oneself, would in this case be, *I shall affirm only my own dignity, but not that of others*. Now apply the categorical imperative by which this maxim is raised to the status of a universal law. The result is: *Everyone shall affirm only his or her own dignity, but not that of others*. This universal law is self-contradictory. When others follow it, they will not treat me as an end in myself while I *do* treat myself as an end in myself.

This account of the personalistic norm is in Kant’s mind not an argument from utility that might run as follows: if I grant the dignity of others, others will repay me by granting mine; therefore it is useful for me to grant them their dignity. No, the main issue for Kant is autonomy, which requires the rational self-consistency of my universal legislative will. I can only be and remain autonomous if I do not contradict my own will by legislating to other persons that they need not treat me as having the dignity of an autonomous person. This is why I must treat others as having dignity, as being an end.

In its actual application, Kant’s personalistic norm works much like the golden rule in the teaching of Jesus. “Do to others as you would have them do to you” (Luke 6:31). “In everything do to others as you would have them do to you; for this is the law and the prophets” (Mt 7:12). Yet, this similarity goes hand in hand with a profound opposition between Kant and the Gospel.

#### (b) The Personalistic Norm in Wojtyła

This opposition becomes apparent when one examines Wojtyła’s account of the personalistic norm. Wojtyła sees the norm as rooted in the rational nature of the person.

A person must not be *merely* the means to an end for another person. This is precluded by the very nature of personhood, by what any person is. For a person is a thinking subject, and capable of making decisions: these, most notably, are the attributes we find in the inner self of a person. This being so, every person is by nature capable of determining his or her aims. Anyone who treats a person as the means to an end does violence to the very essence of the other, to what constitutes its natural right.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5.30.

<sup>17</sup> Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 26-7.

Noteworthy in this argument for the personalistic norm is the focus on the *rational nature* or *essence* of the person. This rational nature allows the person to understand aims or ends and pursue them. In Kant, the key point is not that the person can *understand and pursue* ends, but that the person *is* an ultimate end. The dignity of the person, which lies in autonomy, is itself the highest value. It is the one and only true end. Everything in the entire cosmos can and must be subordinated to it. In this respect, the personalistic norm as Kant understands it is the direct opposite of the same norm as Wojtyła understands it.

Immanuel Kant...formulated...the following imperative: act always in such a way that the other person is the end and not merely the instrument of your action. In the light of the preceding argument this principle should be restated in a form rather different from that which Kant gave it, as follows: whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not treat that person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but must allow for the fact that he or she, too, *has, or at least should have*, distinct personal ends. This principle, thus formulated, lies at the basis of all the human freedoms, properly understood, and especially freedom of conscience.<sup>18</sup>

Wojtyła's understanding of the personalistic norm is indeed "rather different" from Kant's. *Being* an end differs from *having* an end, *being* the highest good differs from *being the beneficiary of* the highest good, *being* God differs from *having* God. One is compatible with being a creature, the other is not. The central disagreement between Kant and Wojtyła lies here. It is closely connected with the question of the common good. According to John Paul II, the created person's highest dignity consists in being able to *participate* in the goodness of God, supremely in the beatific vision. In this participation, the created person becomes "a sharer in the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4). Sharing and participation is separated by an infinite gulf from becoming simply identical with God and being able to claim the status of *being* the final end.

John Paul II does on occasion use more directly Kantian language in speaking of the person as *being* an end.

The person can never be considered a means [lat. instrument] to an end; above all never a means [lat. thing] of "pleasure." The person is and must be nothing other than the end of every act. Only then does the action correspond to the true dignity of the person.<sup>19</sup>

The context of this passage makes clear that "end" refers to the beneficiary of the good. The person is "that for the sake of which" in the sense of "the one for the sake of whom the good is loved" rather than as "the good desired for that person." The Kantian idolatry of the dignity of the person as the highest end of the entire cosmos is not shared by Wojtyła. Wojtyła's understanding of the personalistic norm is closer to Aristotle than to Kant.

### (c) An Integral Vision

In order to see the power of the personalistic norm in establishing an integral vision of the human person and an adequate anthropology in which the

<sup>18</sup> Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 27-8.

<sup>19</sup> John Paul II, *Letter to Families*, 12. The contrast in the Latin text is instrument-end and thing-end rather than means-end, though means-end can be properly understood as well.

whole truth about the person comes to light, one must see its close relation to the commandment of love. The personalistic norm has a negative and a positive component. It forbids the use of other persons as means, pure and simple, and commands treating them as having certain ends.

This norm, in its negative aspect, states that the person is the kind of good which does not admit of use and cannot be treated as an object of use and as such as a means to an end. In its positive form the personalistic norm confirms this: the person is a good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love.<sup>20</sup>

In its positive component the norm is thus close to the commandment of love as formulated in Leviticus and in the teaching of Jesus. "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev 19:18; Mt 19:19 par.). Kant's understanding of the personalistic norm does not imply the commandment of love, because the one and only basis of his norm is autonomy, that is, the absolute dignity of one's own moral self. One's neighbor does not come into view as a person to be loved, but as a particular circumstance for the affirmation of humanity, that is, of the affirmation of my autonomy and my recognition of the autonomy of others.

"Your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path" (Psalm 119:105). These words in praise of the law apply especially to the commandment of love.

This is the law and the prophets (Matt 7:12).

The commandments, You shall not commit adultery; You shall not murder; You shall not steal; You shall not covet; and any other commandment, are summed up in this word, Love your neighbor as yourself. Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law (Rom 13:9-10).

For the whole law is summed up in a single commandment, You shall love your neighbor as yourself (Gal 5:14).

You do well if you really fulfill the royal law according to the scripture, You shall love your neighbor as yourself (Jam 2:8).

These texts show the great illuminating power of the commandment of love. The moral life as a whole becomes intelligible through this one commandment. "Love and then do what you want! *Dilige et quod vis fac.*"<sup>21</sup>

The personalistic norm, understood in light of the commandment of love, stands at the very beginning of the life of persons. It is elementary in the sense of flowing directly from that which accounts for a person being a person in the first place, namely, rational nature. It accompanies the person, of course, also into the supernatural order and its final fulfillment.

## (2) *The Gift of Self*

The second of the two principles affirmed in *Gaudium et spes* 24:3, that "man...cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of self," has its roots...not immediately in human nature, but, as the Council clearly affirms, in the revelation of the Trinity through the teaching and life of Jesus. It is a prin-

<sup>20</sup> Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 41.

<sup>21</sup> St. Augustine, *In Ioannis epistolam tractatus*, 7.8.

ciple that regards, not the beginning, but the supernatural perfection of life, which is referred to by the phrase, “*fully* finding oneself.” Let us return to the full text of *Gaudium et spes* 24:3 to see how the Council situates the gift of self.

Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when he prays to the Father, “that all may be one...as we are one” (John 17:21-22) and thus offers vistas closed to human reason, indicates a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons and the union of God’s sons in Truth and Love. This likeness shows that man, who is the only creature on earth God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of self (cf. Luke 17:33).

(a) The Trinity as Exemplar of the Gift of Self

According to the text’s first sentence, Jesus shows a similarity between the union of divine persons and the union of human persons (“one *as* we are one”). According to the second sentence, this similarity shows that human persons can only find themselves in a gift of self. The theological argument is clear. The basis is the union of divine persons. Its similarity to human communion shows the truth of the law of the gift. The law of the gift must therefore apply also to the Trinitarian exemplar.

The Council insists very clearly on the radical newness of this revelation brought by Jesus. Jesus opens up vistas *closed to human reason*. He opens the unheard-of heart of God’s inner life. The nature of this inner life is briefly alluded to in the phrases, “as we are one” and “union of divine Persons.” An earlier version of *Gaudium et spes* 24:3 was more explicit.

Indeed, Catholic doctrine, opening up vistas closed to human reason, teaches that God, though he is one, subsists in three persons, each of which lives in such a way toward the others that it is constituted by that very relation. One can infer that human persons, since they are created in the image of God one and three and are reformed in his image, show in themselves a certain imitation of him. While, then, man is the only creature on earth which God willed for its own sake, he himself is related out of himself toward others in such a way that he cannot find himself except by giving himself.<sup>22</sup>

This earlier version of *Gaudium et spes* 24:3 bases itself on the “Catholic doctrine” according to which the divine persons are subsistent relations and therefore radically and without any remainder “towards” each other. It is this radical relationality that the draft sees imitated by the divine image in the social life of the human person, specifically in the gift of self. The phrase “he himself is related out of himself toward others” connects “giving himself” with the life of the divine persons as subsistent relations toward each other.

The final text of *Gaudium et spes* 24:3 is more scriptural. The essential point remains, though “relation” does not play an architectonic role any longer on the level of concepts.<sup>23</sup> On what grounds do we know that “man cannot fully

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<sup>22</sup> See Francisco Gil Hellín, *Concilii Vaticani II synopsis, in ordinem redigens schemata cum relationibus necnon Patrum orationes atque animadversiones: Gaudium et spes* (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2003), 171.

<sup>23</sup> For the objections of some of the Council Fathers against the earlier text, and even against the final version, see Friedrich Bechina, *Die Kirche als «Familie Gottes»: Die Stellung dieses theologischen Konzeptes in Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil und in den Bischofssynoden von 1974 bis 1994 im Hinblick auf eine «Familia-Dei-Ekklesiologie»* (Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1998), 221 footnote 129. A complementary account of the objections is found in Pierre d’Ornellas, *Liberté, que dis-tu de toi-même: Une lecture des travaux du Concile Vatican II, 25 janvier 1959 - 8 décembre 1965* (Paris: École Cathédrale, Parole et Silence, 1999), 538-42.

find himself except through a sincere gift of self”? The final text is very clear, clearer than the draft. “This similarity shows... ” It is the similarity between “the union of the divine persons” and “the union of God’s sons in truth and charity” that shows the necessity and efficacy of the gift of self in “finding oneself.” It may well be that the law of the gift is reflected also in the natural order, as St. Thomas argues in his Aristotelian account of love, but *Gaudium et spes* 24:3 does not draw attention to that order as such.

The Trinity as exemplar is concretely mediated by Christ. The Council expresses this point by adding a reference to Luke 17:33 (set in bold below), one of the very few sayings of Jesus reported by all four Gospels, twice in Matthew and Luke. The formulation of the saying in Matthew is closest to the formulation chosen by *Gaudium et spes*: will find his life, will find himself.

*Matt 10:39*: The one who *finds* his life will lose it,  
and the one who loses his life for my sake will *find it*.

*Matt 16:25*: For whoever would save his life will lose it,  
and whoever loses his life for my sake will *find it*.

*Mark 8:35*: For whoever wants to save his life will lose it,  
but whoever loses his life for my sake,  
and for the sake of the gospel, will save it.

*Luke 9:24*: For whoever wants to save his life will lose it,  
but whoever loses his life for my sake will save it.

***Luke 17:33*: Whoever seeks to make his life secure will lose it,  
but whoever loses it will make it live.**

*John 12:25*: The one who loves his life loses it,  
and the one who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life.

Immediately before this saying in Matthew, Mark and the first Lucan text, Jesus speaks about discipleship, denying oneself, taking up one’s cross and following after him. The law of losing and finding, which he formulates as a general law of the life of persons, is an explanation of this discipleship and particularly of the Cross.

The Council links this saying with the prayer of Jesus in John 17. “Holy Father, preserve them in your name, which you have given me, that they may be *one as we*...that all may be *one as you*, Father, are in me and I in you, that *they too* may be in us...that they may be *one as we* are one, I in them and you in me, that they may be completed into one” (John 17:11.21-22).

The twofold appeal to Scripture is not incidental, because the deepest mysteries of faith are at issue, namely, the Trinity and the Cross. By showing us these two mysteries, Scripture “opens up vistas closed to human reason.”

This deep Trinitarian and Christological background must be kept in mind when one reads what John Paul II has to say about “the gift of self” in TOB. In particular, it must be kept in mind in order to see the image of God in the union between man and woman. John Paul II considers this union primarily in its sacramental and thus supernatural richness, though the perspective of nature is by no means suppressed.

## (b) An Anthology on Love as a Gift of Self

The use of “gift of self” in St. Thomas and St. John of the Cross will be analyzed in detail below.<sup>24</sup> The following anthology provides some illustrations of its use elsewhere.

*St. Augustine* († 430)

If I said, “God has promised gold!” you would be delighted. He promised himself, and you are sad? If a rich man does not have God, what does he have? Don’t seek anything from God except God. Love him without payment. Ask him for him himself. Don’t be afraid of poverty. *Let him give himself to us* and let this be enough for us.<sup>25</sup>

God wants to be worshiped and loved without payment, that is, to be loved chastely, to be loved not because he gives something other than himself, but *because he gives himself*.<sup>26</sup>

He who buys something, at whatever price he may have found it, must acquire it in such a way that he gives what he has and receives what he does not have. He from whom the payment departs remains, and that for which he gives the payment comes near. Now, the one who wants to buy this Word, who wants to have it, let him not look outside himself for what he should give in payment. *Let him give himself*. When he does this, he does not lose himself, as he loses a payment when he buys something... Therefore, let the one who wants to buy *give himself*. This is the price of the Word, if one may say so in some way, although he who gives does not lose himself, but acquires the Word for whom he gives himself, and *acquires himself in the Word to whom he gives himself*.<sup>27</sup>

*St. Bernard of Clairvaux* († 1153)

“He spoke and they were made” (Psalm 148:5). Yet, he who made me by merely speaking, by speaking once, certainly remade me by speaking much and by doing wonders... In the first work he *gave me myself*, in the second *himself*, and where *he gave himself*, he *gave me back to myself*. As one *given* and *given back*, I owe myself for myself, and owe myself twice. What shall I *render to God for himself*? Even if I could *give myself* back to him a thousand times, what am I [compared] to God?<sup>28</sup>

*St. Bonaventure* († 1274)

The true body of Christ and his immaculate flesh is contained in this sacrament [of the Eucharist] as pouring itself out for us and uniting us to each other and transforming us into itself through the most burning love, *by which he gave himself to us*, offered himself for us, *gave himself back to us*, and remains with us until the end of the world.<sup>29</sup>

*St. Peter-Julien Eymard (quotations from 1858 and 1865)*

*Give yourselves* well and entirely to Jesus...and you will be true Servants of the Blessed Sacrament. *The gift of oneself* is the one proof of true love; it is everything that God wants. Child, give me your heart, he says... I know very well that it is easy *to give oneself in a general way* all to Jesus... Oh! If we were *totally given to Jesus*. He would be a fixed idea for our heart, the unique rule of our life.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>24</sup> See pp. ###-### and ###-###.

<sup>25</sup> St. Augustine, *Sermo* 331, PL 38, 1461.

<sup>26</sup> St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Psalm 52, par. 8.

<sup>27</sup> St. Augustine, *Sermo* 117, PL 38,662.

<sup>28</sup> St. Bernard of Clairvaux, *De diligendo deo*, ch. 5, par 15; emphasis added.

<sup>29</sup> St. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, 6.9

<sup>30</sup> Manuel Barbiero, *Vita Eucaristica e Vita Religiosa in Saint Pierre-Julien Eymard*. In Chapter Ten of this work, entitled “The Gift of Self,” Barbiero shows that the gift of self is the architectonic notion in St. Peter-Julien’s entire theology. <http://www.sjbrcc.net/giftos.html>

*I gave myself to Him again in order to be all His, as He was to His Father, but how is Jesus to His Father—in His divine life as the Word—How was He to His Father in His mortal life, how is He to His Father in His Sacramental life? This is what I must examine, and repeat in my life.*<sup>31</sup>

*Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay Science, 1882)*

What woman means by love is clear enough: complete *gift* (not mere giving) with soul and body, without any consideration or reserve, rather with shame and horror at the thought of a *gift* that might be subject to special clauses or conditions. In this absence of conditions her love is a faith; woman has no other faith.

Man, when he loves a woman, wants precisely this love from her and is thus himself as far as can be from the presupposition of feminine love. Supposing, however, that there should also be men to whom the desire for *total gift* is not alien; well, then they simply are—not men. A man who loves like a woman becomes a slave; while a woman who loves like a woman becomes a more perfect woman.

A woman's passion in its unconditional renunciation of rights of her own presupposes precisely that on the other side there is no equal pathos, no equal will to renunciation; for if both partners felt impelled by love to renounce themselves, we should then get—I do not know what; perhaps an empty space?

Woman wants to be taken and accepted as a possession, wants to be absorbed into the concept of 'possession,' 'possessed.' Consequently, she wants someone who takes, *who does not give himself or give himself away*; on the contrary, he is supposed to become richer in 'himself'—through the accretion of strength, happiness, and faith given him by the woman *who gives herself*. Woman *gives herself away*, man takes more—I do not see how one can get around this natural opposition by means of social contracts or with the best will in the world to be just, desirable as it may be not to stare at the harshness, terror and enigma of this antagonism. For love, thought of in its entirety as great and full, is nature, and being nature it is in all eternity something "immoral."<sup>32</sup>

*Robert Louis Stevenson (David Balfour, 1892)*

"Cattriona," I cried, gazing on her hard, "is it a mistake again? Am I quite lost?" She raised her head to me, breathless. "Do you want me, Davie, truly?" said she, and I scarce could hear her say it. "I do that," said I. "O, sure you know it—I do that." "I have nothing left to give or to keep back," said she. "I was all yours from the first day, if you would have had a gift of me!" she said.<sup>33</sup>

*Charles de Koninck (The Cosmos, 1936)*

*Possession of oneself* is a condition of the *gift of self*. And that is why God alone can *give Himself* in a full sense, for He alone *possesses Himself* in an absolute manner. His *communication of self* is even so profound that it is terminated in beings capable of imitating him and *giving themselves* in their turn; although God is the absolute cause of *the gift of self* in all intellectual creatures.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Barbiero, *Pierre-Julien Eymard*, <http://www.sjbrcc.net/giftos.html>

<sup>32</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* (translated, with commentary, by Walter Kaufmann; New York: Vintage Books, 1974), Aphorism 363, pp. 318-9, translation modified.

<sup>33</sup> Robert Louis Stevenson, *David Balfour* (Charles Scribner's Sons : New York, 1892 [1924]) 341.

<sup>34</sup> Charles De Koninck, "The Cosmos," in *The Writings of Charles De Koninck*, ed. Ralph McInerney (2008), 308.

## (c) The Two Principles in Wojtyła Before the Council

Together with Jean Danielou, Wojtyła had the responsibility of producing one of the drafts of *Gaudium et spes*.<sup>35</sup> He may well be in some measure responsible for the paragraph containing the two principles of the life of persons. He explicitly formulated and joined the two principles already some years before *Gaudium et spes* in *Love and Responsibility*, first delivered as a series of lectures in 1957-59 and published in 1960. One passage is particularly clear because it speaks about two specific principles that govern the existence of persons, the personalistic norm and the law of the gift of self.

One person can give himself or herself, can surrender entirely to another, whether to a human person or to God, and such a giving of the self creates a special form of love which we define as spousal love. This fact goes to prove that the person has a dynamism of its own and [that]...*specific laws govern its existence and evolution*. Christ gave expression to this in a saying which is on the face of it profoundly paradoxical: "The one who finds his life will lose it, and the one who loses his life for my sake will find it." (Mt 10:39).

Indeed, the problem of spousal love does contain a profound paradox, a very real, and not merely a verbal paradox: the words of the Gospel point to a concrete reality, and the truth which they contain is made manifest in the life of the person. Thus, of its very nature, no person can be transferred or ceded to another. In the natural order it is oriented toward self-perfection, towards the attainment of an ever greater fullness of existence—which is, of course, always the existence of some concrete "I". We have already stated that this self-perfection proceeds side by side with love. The fullest, the most uncompromising form of love consists precisely in self-giving, in making one's inalienable and non-transferable "I" someone else's property. This is doubly paradoxical: firstly in that it is possible to step outside one's own "I" in this way, and secondly in that the "I" far from being destroyed or impaired as a result is enlarged and enriched—of course in a super-physical, moral sense. The Gospel stresses this very clearly and unambiguously: "would lose—shall find again," "would save—shall lose." You will readily see that we have here *not merely the personalistic norm but also bold and explicit words of advice*, which make it possible for us *to amplify and elaborate on that norm*. The world of persons *possesses its own laws of existence and of development*.<sup>36</sup>

With full clarity, this text formulates the two principles of the life of persons found in *Gaudium et spes* 24:3. It formulates them as a comprehensive pair of principles that throw light on human life as a whole. Wojtyła even appeals to the same saying of Jesus to which *Gaudium et spes* 24:3 also appeals.

The text is helpful for understanding *Gaudium et spes* 24:3. It shows that the personalistic principle and the principle of the gift of self do not stand next to each other without any connection. The principle of the gift of self "amplifies and elaborates" on the personalistic principle. The two principles concern one single reality, namely, the life of the person, first in its beginnings and potential in human nature, then in its full realization in the divinized love of those who have been grasped by Christ.

Wojtyła found a parallel pair of principles in Kant that governs the entire architecture of Kant's understanding of sexuality and marriage.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup> See d'Ornellas, *Liberté*, especially pp. 22, 447-54, 481-3.

<sup>36</sup> Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 97, emphasis added.

<sup>37</sup> See below, pp. ####.####.

- The personalistic principle: “In all of creation, everything one might want and over which one has power can be used *as a mere means*. Only man himself and with him every rational creature is *end in itself*.”<sup>38</sup>
- The principle of sexual union as a gift of self: “For, the natural use that one sex makes of the sexual organs of the other is *enjoyment [Genuss]*, for which a part gives itself to the other [*sich dem anderen hingibt*]. In this act, a human being makes himself into a thing [*Sache*], which is contrary to the right of human nature to one’s own person...Now, the acquisition of one bodily member of a human being is at the same time an acquisition of the whole person, because the person is an absolute unity.”<sup>39</sup>

Kant’s understanding of sexuality and marriage is built on this pair of principles as on two interlocking and complementary ways of grasping the whole: no person can be a means; in sexual union each person gives itself to be used as a means for pleasure. The only way to preserve one’s human dignity in that depersonalizing sexual gift of self is to acquire the other person as a thing in marriage. In this way one regains one’s dignity of autonomy despite its loss in being sexually “enjoyed” by the other. In this way, the pair of principles in Kant is quite the contrary of the parallel pair in Wojtyła.

In Wojtyła’s understanding of the pair of principles, the gift of self is positive. It does not consist in letting another person use one’s sexual qualities for pleasure, but in the gift of the person through love, resulting in the communion of persons, expressed through the body in such a way that sexual pleasure becomes itself a constituent of the expression of love. Still, the pair of principles is evidently so similar that there must be some connection. The hypothesis of a direct line of descent from Kant’s *Metaphysics of Morals* through Wojtyła’s *Love and Responsibility* to *Gaudium et spes* 24:3 would be too simple. Wojtyła’s immersed himself in the theology of the gift of self in John of the Cross long before his reading of Kant. The personalistic norm and the law of the gift were known also to other participants in the Council. Still, Kant’s sexual ethics may have been an important catalyst for formulating the *pair* of principles governing the life of persons.

When Wojtyła began to study Kant, having already been formed by John of the Cross, he must have heard an inverse echo, as it were, of the *Doctor Mysticus* in Kant’s account of sexuality and marriage, at least on the terminological level of “gift of self.” What human dignity and the gift of self mean for Wojtyła differs profoundly, of course, from what they mean for Kant.

### c. The Two Principles in St. John of the Cross

#### (1) *Personal Subjectivity*

It is significant that Wojtyła first encountered the teaching of St. Thomas indirectly, in the writings of St. John of the Cross, and only afterwards in the Neo-Thomist lectures and manuals of his seminary training. In his dissertation, when he had become familiar with St. Thomas’s theology, he was able to

<sup>38</sup> Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5.87, cf. 5.131. See also Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 6.434.

<sup>39</sup> Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 6.278.